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1 This K4D Helpdesk report is the second part in a series of two reports on regional tax issues. The first report 
focusses on tax competition and its implications for LMICs, while this second report has a focus on regional 
coordination efforts in sub-Sahara Africa to tackle harmful tax competition. 
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1. Overview  
Compared to other trade blocs the West African Economic and Monetary Union’s (WAEMU) tax 
coordination process is one of the most advanced in the world. However, it is ineffective in many 
areas. Its framework has, to some extent, succeeded in converging tax systems, particularly 
statutory tax rates. It has also led to some convergence of countries’ tax systems, and in turn to 
positive revenue effects in WAEMU member states. However, the literature also shows that there 
are large gaps between de jure and de facto coordination, as WAEMU has failed to provide its 
regional institutions with the necessary resources to undertake effective surveillance. This has 
led to ineffective enforcement and undermined the credibility of coordination. In fact, the 
framework allows for unfettered tax competition as long as this is done outside the countries’ 
main tax laws. This has made their tax systems opaque, increased complexity and contributed to 
a culture of tax negotiation (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013; Tax Justice Network & ActionAid, 
2015; Diakité et al., 2017).  
Because of the advanced tax coordination process and the existence of a tax coordination 
framework in the WAEMU, this report focusses in particular on the West African region. In the 
same region the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), although more 
recently, is also in the process of adopting WAEMU experiences and framework for its own 
circumstances, in particular for indirect taxation. Furthermore, this report also looks at the tax 
coordination and harmonisation efforts of the East African Community (EAC), Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA).  
Overall, this report concludes that member countries have pushed for coordination and 
harmonisation, mainly in the area of indirect taxation (VAT and excises). Only the WAEMU has 
legislatives in place to coordinate direct taxation, in particular on corporate income taxation (CIT), 
however, with limitations on tax incentives, as already expressed above. EAC has made some 
progress on coordinating direct taxation and limiting harmful tax competition. 
Tax harmonisation highlights difficult political economy issues, including the lack of commitment 
on behalf of member states to coordinate their tax policies effectively and lack of building, 
maintaining and financing the necessary institutions. This cannot only be observed in the African 
context, but can be observed in other regional economic communities all over the world. 
Due to the lack of literature on tax harmonisation and tax harmonisation in the context of regional 
economic integration in Africa, this report has been based on a mix of sources that include some 
academic research and papers from financial organisations such as the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), combined with many internet sources from local newspapers and local institutions, 
which are mentioned in footnotes.  
2. Tax coordination and regional economic integration  
The literature shows that within the context of a regional economic community that embodies the 
establishment of a customs union, a common market and a monetary union, a lack of a certain 
level of harmonisation of the national tax systems and a lack of harmonised tax policy could 
compromise integration as a whole (e.g. IMF, 2015b, p.30). Therefore, as member states enter 
the phase of a common market, they also aim to harmonise their tax policies with a view of 
removing tax distortions and increase investment and economic growth. The end aim of this 
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being to ensure a more efficient allocation of resources within the community (Diakité et al., 
2017, p.4).  
The general conclusion of empirical studies that have assessed the performance of regional 
blocs in Africa is that member countries have failed to achieve their objectives of increasing intra-
regional trade significantly, in particular, and fostering general policy coordination (Nnyanzi, 
2016, p.939). As such, in the debate about the contribution of regional economic integration to 
revenue mobilisation, one of the objectives (at least for the long term), is still open-ended, 
depending on the quality of their institutions, the level of policy harmonisation and how 
homogeneous or heterogeneous the partner countries are (Nnyanzi, 2016, p.935).  
The EU is seen in many parts of the world as the benchmark for economic integration, and 
consequently as an example of tax coordination among sovereign states. The coordination 
framework approach in regional economic communities in Africa is broadly based on the EU 
model of coordination. However, it differs from it in many ways due to the limited powers and 
resources of regional institutions (Diakité et al., 2017; Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013). 
There are three ways to tackle harmful tax competition (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.7): 
• Tax harmonisation eliminates interactions between countries. Three elements describe 
tax harmonisation: an equalisation of tax rates, a common definition of national tax 
bases, and a uniform application of agreed rules. The latter is particularly important since 
tax competition can take the form of lax application of tax rules, such as low audit rates. 
• Tax coordination is used when the set of countries which coordinate is given, and in 
which the coordination concerns only some tax policy instruments. 
• Tax cooperation is used when the set of countries is endogenously determined and is 
designates on situations where only some countries cooperate on tax policy and issues. 
This report focusses on tax coordination and tax harmonisation as they are more explicit in their 
efforts to tackle harmful tax competition between countries2 as an effort to reduce the risks of 
distorting trade and investment and the erosion of national tax bases. It does this by:3 
• establishing and regularly maintaining an online tax database that provides 
comprehensive information about countries national tax structures;  
• collaborating on tax incentives that encourage investment, rather than those that reduce 
transparency or purely act as a vehicle for tax minimisation; 
• creating a clear and transparent system of taxation that harmonises policies to prevent 
investment barriers and to avoid double taxation; 
• developing expertise of  tax officials with support for training programmes and seminars 
on tax design, policy, and best practices; 
• discouraging the spread of tax havens and harmful preferential tax regimes and 
encouraging those countries which presently engage in harmful tax practices to review 
their existing measures; 
                                                   
2 See K4D Helpdesk report no. 324 about the impact of tax competition between countries.  
3 Presentation for the International Tax Justice Academy 2014 by Cephas Makunike. Retrieved from 
http://slideplayer.com/slide/6576005/  
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• helping countries move towards the “level playing field” which is so essential to the 
continued expansion of regional and continental economic growth, and; 
• developing regional tax guidelines/directives and commentaries which shape good and 
common tax designs and systems. 
3. West Africa and tax coordination  
WAEMU versus ECOWAS 
In the West African region two regional economic entities have been involved in regional tax 
coordination and harmonisation both on tax rates and tax policy. The West African Economic 
and Monetary Union (WAEMU) has had a long history of tax coordination and harmonisation 
efforts since 1994. Its member countries4 share a single currency - the CFA Franc (Franc de la 
Communauté Financière Africaine) -, form a customs union, and have had extensive tax 
coordination and harmonisation experience in domestic taxation.5 Over 80% of member 
countries’ tax (including tariff) revenues are derived from taxes that are subject to regional 
directives or regulations (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.3). Following the devaluation of the 
CFA in 1994, member states signed the WAEMU Treaty; by August 1994 they had all ratified it. 
The formation of the customs union with a common external tariff (CET) was completed by 2000; 
directives on value-added tax (VAT) and excises were introduced in 1998; and, by 2009, the 
region completed a set of directives in relation to capital income taxation.6 
In tax policy, the WAEMU Treaty goes farther than the EU; in addition to coordinating the setting 
of tax rates and bases for the major taxes through regional directives, it mandates the 
convergence of the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio to at least 17%, and the convergence of tax 
revenue structures (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.4).7 The tax revenue structure is part of 
the so-called “transition fiscale” (tax transition), under which WAEMU countries must adopt tax 
and tariff policies that, over time, enable them to shift their revenue structure from trade to 
domestic taxes.8 Article 4 of the Treaty explicitly calls for harmonisation of member states’ tax 
legislation.  
                                                   
4 The original member countries are Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. Guinea-
Bissau became the 8th member of the Union on 2 May 1997. 
5 The Central African Economic and Monetary Union is another region similar to WAEMU, but with less 
experience in domestic tax coordination. 
6 The tax coordination in WAEMU is based on five decisions, which led to the elaboration of Directives: Decision 
N◦01/98/CM/UEMOA concerns the harmonisation of Domestic Indirect Taxation; Decision 
N◦10/2006/CM/UEMOA defines the tax transition Programme of the Union; Decision N◦16/2006/CM/UEMOA 
concerns the implementation of the Direct taxation coordination; Decision N◦34/2009/CM/UEMOA fixes the tax 
transition indicators and Decision N◦35/2009/CM/UEMOA establishes the follow-up actions of the tax transition 
Programme. 
7 The EU convergence criteria are often defined in terms of tax policy design (e.g., minimum excise tax rates), 
and not in terms of revenue results. 
8 The Decision N◦34/2009/CM/UEMOA proposed criteria and indicators for the tax transition. Firstly, principal 
criteria, namely the ratio of trade tax to overall tax which must be equal to or below 45%; the ratio of domestic tax 
to overall tax which must be equal to or above 55% and the ratio of domestic tax to trade tax which must be equal 
to or above 1.5. It proposed also additional criteria such as the ratio VAT plus excises to overall tax. Secondly, 
performance indicators (allowing to measure the impact of the tax transition on tax revenue mobilisation) and 
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The second regional economic entity is the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) of which all WAEMU countries are members together with the English speaking 
countries in the region.9 ECOWAS has had less of a history of tax coordination and 
harmonisation and does not explicitly mention it in its revised treaty (reprinted in 2010).10 
However, in recent years there has been a shift in efforts towards tax coordination and tax 
harmonisation by making use of the experiences of WAEMU countries and with the aim to 
mobilise tax revenue, create a better investment climate in the region, and to tackle harmful tax 
competition, in particular in indirect consumption taxation (e.g. VAT, excises).  
Tax coordination for indirect taxation 
Trade duties coordination: 
In 2000 the WAEMU member states agreed a CET with four rates: 0% on essential and social 
goods; 5% on primary goods; 10% on capital and intermediate goods; and 20% on final 
consumption goods. Member-countries can request safeguarding measures at the WAEMU 
Commission. Since January 2015 the CET of the 15 member countries of the ECOWAS, of 
which WAEMU is part, became effective; liberalising trade within ECOWAS and nullifying the 
common legislation on the CET of the WAEMU countries.11  
The ECOWAS framework is the same as the WAEMU; it is an enlargement of their CET 
framework, with the same four tariff bands. Therefore, and because WAEMU member countries 
have limited intra-regional trade within the non-WAEMU ECOWAS members, it has had very 
limited impact on tax revenue. However, the ECOWAS CET increased tariff protection for 
WAEMU countries with the introduction of a new 35% tariff band for specific goods, and the 
possibility to deviate from the CET for 3% of their tariff lines for several years (IMF, 2016, p.22).  
VAT coordination: 
The Value-Added Tax (VAT) directive in the WAEMU was introduced in 1998. One primary 
objective of the VAT directive was to assist countries in compensating the revenue loss induced 
by the reduction of tariff rates on trade with a more efficient tax than cascading sales taxes - 
which pre-dated the VATs in several WAEMU countries. The food and energy price crisis of 
2006–2008 led to pressure to narrow the base of VAT to respond to social unrests in the region. 
In 2009, the WAEMU Council of Ministers approved Directive 02/2009/CM/UEMOA, which 
accomplished this narrowing (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.11).  
                                                   
monitoring indicators (allowing to appreciate the extent to which the specific objectives are delivered). Moreover, 
the Decision N◦35/2009/CM/UEMOA adopted the monitoring system of the tax transition program. It is composed 
of a regional steering committee ensuring the implementation of the program and a national monitoring 
committee supervising its implementation (Diakité et al., 2017, p.7). 
9 ECOWAS was established in 1999 and includes the following countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and 
Togo. (Mauritania left ECOWAS in 2002.) 
10 Retrieved from the ECOWAS website: http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Revised-treaty.pdf  
11 Retrieved from ICTSD (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development) website: 
https://www.ictsd.org/bridges-news/bridges-africa/news/west-africa-starts-implementing-the-common-external-
tariff  
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• In 1998 it introduced a single positive tax rate that member states can set between 15 
and 20%; expanded with the introduction of a lower positive VAT rate in 2009 between 5 
and 10% for a limited list of items, which include: bottled and powder milk, sugar, all 
types of pasta, flour, rice, wheat, and other grains; agricultural equipment (including 
rental and maintenance services); food for livestock and poultry; computers; solar energy 
equipment; and tourism-related services, including restaurants.  
• In 1998 a list of mandatory exemptions for VAT was introduced, including: health 
services and medications; education services, books, newspapers, magazines, and other 
periodicals; banking, insurance and re-insurance services. In 2009 natural gas for 
domestic use was added to the list of exempt items. 
• In 1998 it set a VAT registration threshold for all member states between CFA Franc 30 
and 50 million for the supply of goods and between 15 and 25 million for the supply of 
services. In 2009 the upper bound of the registration threshold was increased to CFA 
Franc 100 million for goods, and to 50 million for services.  
• Other regulations, like VAT on inputs is generally deductible from VAT on taxable 
outputs, except for: meals and entertainment expenses, motor vehicles (excluding 
leasing companies) and fuel expenses. Importantly, member states can extend these 
exclusions to other inputs as the VAT directive does not impose any limits on such 
exclusions. 
In 2010, all the WAEMU member states had implemented the VAT Directive except from Bissau 
Guinea which was the only country in the Union that had not adopted a VAT regime. However, 
none of the members refunded any VAT credits according to the Community legislation (Diakité 
et al., 2017, p.7). 
The ECOWAS has a VAT framework and aims for harmonisation, but there is no common 
legislative in place.12 Hence, member states have a variety of VAT from 5% (Nigeria) to 10% 
(Liberia) to 18% (Togo).13 ECOWAS member states are working on the harmonisation of VAT 
exemptions on basic food items in their raw states, medicaments and pharmaceutical products to 
ensure equal treatment of all economic operators in the community.14 
Excise taxes coordination: 
The excise tax directive in WAEMU was also introduced in 1998. The excise rates are set with 
broad ranges. Three amendments were made to the directive in 2009: minimum and maximum 
rates on alcohol and tobacco were increased by 5% (alcoholic beverages have an excise tax 
between 15 and 50%, and tobacco products between 15 and 45% after 2009); five items were 
added to the optional list; and member states were limited to excise only six items from the 
optional list. The main argument in favour of coordinating the setting of excise taxes in a common 
                                                   
12 See for example the 1996 ECOWAS protocol A/P2/7/96 on establishing VAT in ECOWAS member states: 
http://documentation.ecowas.int/download/en/legal_documents/protocols/Protocol%20Establishing%20Value%20
Added%20Tax%20in%20ECOWAS%20Member%20States.pdf     
13 Retrieved from the ThomsonReuters blog (12 February 2016): 
https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/blog/onesource/vat-gst-management/vat-increase-nigeria/  
14 Retrieved from the website of The Premium Times website in Nigeria: 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/foreign/west-africa-foreign/250508-ecowas-increase-duties-tobacco-unhealthy-
products.html 
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market with fiscal borders is to minimise intra-community cross-border shopping and smuggling. 
In this regard, while there is a good case to coordinate excise tax setting in the WAEMU, its 
geography poses difficult challenges; the region is surrounded by large countries with very 
porous borders (neighbouring Mauritania, Nigeria, and Ghana in particular) and, in some cases, 
applying relatively low excise taxes (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.14). 
A separate Directive issued in 2001 covers excises and other taxes on petroleum products 
(namely aviation gasoline, premium fuel, regular gasoline, kerosene, gas oil, fuel oil, and butane) 
with the aim of harmonising prices, ensuring more transparency and creating a business-friendly 
environment.15 It mandated a specific excise (per litre or kilo) but did not impose any constraint 
on the tax rate: it set the lower bound at 0%, and imposed no upper bound. Its main purpose was 
first and foremost the elimination of subsidies, which weighed heavily on member states’ fiscal 
performance, and the consolidation of a plethora of specific taxes (Diakité et al., 2017, p.8). 
ECOWAS is set to harmonise excise duties on tobacco and other unhealthy products to increase 
revenue and reduce consumption of these products in the sub-region. The decision was part of 
the aims of the meeting of the ECOWAS Financial Council of Ministers in Abuja in November 
2017.16 Member states had begun work on draft directive to harmonise excise duties on tobacco 
products and include legislative and regulatory provisions of member states in tracking and 
tracing mechanisms related to tobacco products. The draft document considers the 
establishment of an ECOWAS Customs Code aimed at harmonising customs legislations in the 
sub-region, in line with international requirements. Member states had developed a draft 
institutional framework for monitoring and steering of the ECOWAS Fiscal Transition 
Programme.17 
Tax coordination for direct taxation 
Corporate income tax coordination: 
Two 2008 directives in WAEMU cover corporate income tax coordination (CIT): Directive 
01/2008/CM/UEMOA defines a common corporate tax base; and Directive 08/2008/CM/UEMOA 
specifies the range for a single rate between 25 and 30%. The harmonisation of the tax rates and 
tax base have been implemented in all countries, however, there are many exemptions.18 For 
example, a holding company regime was introduced in 2011 exempting from corporate income 
tax the profits of holding companies, their dividends distribution (from tax at the individual level), 
                                                   
15 Source: Article 3, Directive N◦01/2007/CM/UEMOA. 
16 Retrieved from the website of The Premium Times website in Nigeria: 
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/foreign/west-africa-foreign/250508-ecowas-increase-duties-tobacco-unhealthy-
products.html 
17 The programme was designed to facilitate mobilisation of domestic resources for development, monitor the 
fiscal coordination of domestic taxes and eliminate double taxation. 
18 Member states should exempt from the tax base the following income sources: capital gains on business 
assets if the taxpayer intends, within three years, to reinvest the total proceeds from selling the assets in a 
WAEMU member state; inter-corporate dividends to the extent that the holding company has a controlling interest 
(defined as at least 10% of the shares) in the payer company, and that both companies are WAEMU residents in 
all other cases, and at least 40% of inter-corporate dividends should be taxable (Diakité et al., 2017, p.8). 
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and capital gains realised on the sale of their shares. The regime is targeted to venture capital 
companies. 
Also, a mining regulation was introduced in 2003. It provides that firms are subject to the general 
tax laws of member states, and to a royalty, whose base and rates will be determined later by 
application rules. The regulation was provided for stability of the tax regime, both for taxes 
imposed at the national level (insuring against increases in taxes but allowing taxpayers to 
benefit from reductions) and the royalty that was to be fixed regionally. In terms of tax incentives, 
the regulation provided for the exemption of virtually all taxes and fees during the exploration 
phase. The main incentives provided during the production phase are accelerated depreciation, 
and a three-year tax holiday from profit and payroll taxes; the modalities for the coverage and 
calculation of accelerated depreciation have not been issued (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, 
p.16). 
The most important elements of directive on tax base competition include: flexibility in setting tax 
depreciation rules; and flexibility in designing transfer pricing and thin capitalisation rules. But the 
most important source of tax competition among WAEMU countries remain the derogatory 
regimes provided in non-tax legislations, such as Investment Codes, Free Zone Codes, and 
other sectoral codes, which are explicitly permitted under Article 8 of the corporate income tax 
directive (Diakité et al., 2017, p.10). 
ECOWAS’ focus is yet on indirect tax coordination and harmonisation and has not yet made 
significant progress on direct taxation. 
Portfolio income coordination: 
Directive 02/2010/CM/UEMOA in WAEMU specifies the types and tax rate intervals that member 
countries should apply to various portfolio incomes. While one objective of the WAEMU Treaty, 
and the various directives, is to promote investment in the region, dividends are taxed at higher 
rates than interest, and interest income on corporate bonds is taxed at higher rates than interest 
income on government bonds (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.16). 
About income from bonds issued by government, public entities and their dismemberments, they 
are taxed to 3% if the term of the bond range from 5 years to 10 years. The rate tax is 0% for the 
long-term bonds (with a duration higher than 10 years). Gains on the assignment of bonds 
cannot be taxed at a rate exceeding 5% of the amount. Incomes distributed by the Undertakings 
for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities and other collective investment funds are 
exempted, besides the gains on the assignments of such institutions. 
Multilateral tax treaty: 
The multilateral tax treaty (MTT) in WEAMU was adopted by Directive 08/2008/CM/UEMOA; 
application rules were issued in 2010 (005/COM/2010/UEMOA). It distributes the taxing rights of 
WAEMU states in respect of intra-community investment. The MTT covers taxes on income and 
inheritance, and registration fees and stamp duties, including those collected by the central 
governments on behalf of sub-central governments. The MTT also covers issues of information 
exchange and mutual assistance in tax collection; it has a non-discrimination clause, and 
provides for a dispute resolution mechanism (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.19). 
The creation of an information exchange platform was advocated and those of a steering 
committee and a management committee ensuring the management of the platform. The 
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steering committee should be in charge of preparing and supervising the implementation of the 
platform. The management committee should be in charge of the administrative management 
and monitoring the proper functioning of the platform. At last, the member states should 
cooperate with the Commission of WAEMU for its inception and operationalisation (Diakité et al., 
2017, p.10). 
ECOWAS also drafted a Supplementary Act adopting community rules on the taxation of income, 
capital and inheritance and the rules for their application within ECOWAS to eliminate double 
taxation, remove barriers to cross-border trade and investments, combat tax evasion, capital 
flight and facilitate revenue mobilisation. The draft Regulation of Exchange of Information to 
counter tax evasion, improve voluntary tax compliance and stimulate resource mobilisation is 
very much needed as six ECOWAS member states have not committed to any information 
exchange instrument.19  
Impact of tax coordination 
Econometric analysis of WAEMU partner countries shows that tariff and tax coordination, in 
particular related to indirect taxation, have improved revenue mobilisation in member states 
(Diakité et al., 2017; Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013).20 There is a structural break in the tax-to-
GDP ratio for the whole Union in 2000, the year the CET was fully phased in and less than two 
years after the VAT and excise directives (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.31). In general, 
member countries seem to follow the most visible parameters of the WAEMU directives: tax 
rates, with a shift from customs duties and corporate income tax towards VAT and excises. 
Development in the corporate income tax rate shows a slow decline over 1990–2005, and then a 
steep one that coincided with the introduction of the corporate income tax rate and base 
directives in 2008. It is interesting that the corporate income tax interval prescribed by the rate 
directive imposed a minimum rate of 25%, 10 points below the rates practiced by WAEMU 
countries in 2008. 
Impact of VAT coordination in WAEMU shows that a relatively good revenue performance of 
VATs in member states. For example, Brun and Diakité (2016) found a high value-added tax 
effort in WAEMU comparatively to some other developing areas. In 2010, VAT revenue 
productivity, the yield of one point of the VAT rate expressed in percentage of GDP, was 0.2 in 
Côte d’Ivoire, around 0.3 in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, 0.35 in Togo, and around 0.4 in Benin 
                                                   
19 Retrieved from the West African Tax Administration Forum (WATAF) website: http://wataf-tax.org/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/ECOWAS-AEOI.pdf   
20 One study of Diakité et al. (2017) found: The domestic indirect taxes revenue mobilisation in a large number of 
WAEMU member states (as for the whole Union) has been affected by the reforms and the effects are positive in 
general for the first years following the 1998 reforms. A study of Mansour & Rota-Graziosi (2015) found that in 
terms of tax levels Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau and Togo are well below the convergence criteria of 17% of 
GDP and that their revenue effort improved only marginally since 2000. Mali and Niger have mobilised significant 
revenue since 1995, but mostly from the mining sector. The revenue increase in Niger is especially impressive 
over 2005–2010, a period of significant increase in commodity prices. Benin has capitalised on its strategic 
geographical location with respect to Nigeria to improve its tariff revenue through re-exports. It is the only country 
where this source of revenue increased significantly since 1995 in tandem with an increase in VAT revenue; in 
other countries, VAT revenue has substituted for tariff revenue. Senegal’s revenue performance is impressive 
and almost entirely linked to the VAT and excises, which account for over 50 percent of tax revenue. Senegal, 
and to a lesser extent Burkina Faso, seem to have progressed best in transiting from tariff to domestic tax 
revenue. 
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and Senegal (Mansour, 2013, p.12). The low rate in Côte d’Ivoire is partly due to its high export 
share in GDP (oil, Cocoa and coffee). However, investors complain about the VAT directive as 
they observe limitations on deductibility/refundability, which has given an extra incentive for 
member states’ investment codes to offer VAT tax holidays. Under these holidays, the input of an 
investment project is often exempted from VAT, typically during the investment development 
phase and future significant expansions (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.12; Tax Justice 
Network, 2015; IBFD, 2013). 
The direct taxes coordination in WAEMU started in the year 2008 defining a common corporate 
tax base. It does not seem to have affected the revenue mobilisation. This is not surprising, given 
that the direct taxes’ Directives have not resolved the crucial problem of the tax exemptions 
granted by countries to attract the foreign direct investments (Diakité et al., 2017, p.18). Non-tax 
laws, primarily investment codes, are used in WAEMU states to circumvent the constraints 
imposed by regional tax directives. This behaviour is even allowed by the same directives that 
are supposed to harmonise or coordinate national tax policies. There are no directives or 
regulations at the regional level dealing with the provision of special tax regimes in member 
states. Generally, each directive provides for exemptions or rate reductions that are either 
compulsory or optional. These special regimes can be found in sectoral laws (e.g., investment 
laws; mining and petroleum laws; free zone laws; etc.), or they can be discretionary - provided by 
presidential or ministerial decrees, and generally without Parliament’s consent (Mansour & Rota-
Graziosi, 2013; Tax Justice Network, 2015; IBFD, 2013).  
In terms of impact on intra-community trade, progress is hard to detect, and is certainly far less 
than policy-makers had expected. The share of intra-community trade (relative to total WAEMU 
trade) has not increased since the early 1990s, but trade patterns have changed. In particular, 
exports of Senegal and Togo to the rest of the WAEMU have increased, at the expense of those 
of Côte d’Ivoire, as have imports from the rest of the community to Burkina Faso and Guinea-
Bissau (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.9). Egoume and Nayo (2011) attribute these shifts in 
trade patterns largely to two factors: the relative size of Côte d’Ivoire and the high intra-WAEMU 
transportation costs relative to international costs. These two factors tended to reinforce one 
another during the Ivoirian crisis of 2010-2011. 
The lack of intra-trade growth can be explained. Physical borders and control of intracommunity 
trade remain to a large extent as they were before the establishment of the CET. And tariff 
revenue, unlike in the EU, accrues to the country of final destination, which remains ultimately 
responsible for collecting its own revenue from the application of the CET. This provides 
opportunities for member states to protect their markets and for customs officials to seek rent 
through the enforcement of the CET (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013, p.10). 
In ECOWAS tax coordination and harmonisation has been started more recently and no studies 
could be found on the impact of the measures for example on revenues. 
Lessons learned from WAEMU 
• Tax coordination framework may have had the unintended effect of contributing to the 
fragmentation of policies at the national level by providing countries with the incentive to 
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enact special tax regimes outside their tax laws.21 This is particularly the case of 
investment incentives, where the framework allows unfettered tax competition as long as 
it is done outside countries’ main tax laws. This, in turn, has made tax systems opaque, 
increased their complexity, and contributed to a culture of "tax negotiation" (Mansour & 
Rota-Graziosi, 2013).  
• The coordination framework has allowed some convergence of countries’ tax systems 
(notably statutory tax rates), which in turn may have contributed to the positive revenue 
performance observed in WAEMU member states since 2000. This is particularly the 
case of VAT and excises on tobacco products and alcoholic beverages. However, the 
future of the CIT (other than on resource activities) is uncertain in the region, as there is 
little evidence that the 2008 CIT directives have had any impact on corporate tax 
competition (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013). 
• That it should be better to take a top-down approach to coordination instead of a softer 
approach of sharing best practices and limiting certain types of harmful tax competition. 
Institutions help ensure government accountability and prevent leakage of public funds. 
They also increase efficiency of scarce public resources and improve the chance of 
maintaining fiscal stability and meeting social development needs (Kireyev, 2016). 
However, as the credibility of the coordination framework depends in large part on the 
credibility of its regional institutions, the WAEMU has yet to provide its regional 
institutions with the necessary resources to undertake effective surveillance (IMF, 2016). 
• Increasing domestic revenue should be a foremost policy priority of tax coordination. 
WAEMU countries have significant room to improve domestic tax collection (including 
income tax) by 0.8 up to 2% of GDP, by broadening the tax base and strengthening tax 
administration. In particular, eliminating the exemptions for VAT not included in the 
WAEMU code and increasing the excise tax rate for products, such as tobacco and 
luxury goods, in line with WAEMU directives would be beneficial. (IMF, 2016). 
• Political leaders in the WAEMU underestimated the difficulties and challenges of tariff 
and tax coordination. This is most obviously clear in the gaps that exist between the 
objectives of economic integration as set out in the WAEMU Treaty of 1994, and the 
effectiveness of the tax directives and regulations that were produced in order to meet 
these objectives (Mansour & Rota-Graziosi, 2013).  
• Policymakers did not take sufficiently into account the implementation and enforcement 
implications at the regional level, particularly the need for effective surveillance. This 
                                                   
21 Article 4 allow for various, and possibly conflicting, interpretations of the role of tax coordination. For example, 
Paragraph A states that one objective of the Treaty is to reinforce the economic competitiveness of member 
countries, but does not clarify whether this objective is to make the region competitive vis-à-vis the rest of the 
world (ROW), or to give individual countries latitude in providing their own tax incentives—which implies some 
degree of competition among them as well as with the ROW. The former case is compatible with coordinating the 
taxation of capital within the region; the second may not be. This lack of clarity is probably the main reason 
behind the failure to harmonize investment codes (ICs); member states tend to see the competition game as one 
played as much among them as with the ROW. An initiative to agree on a regional IC has been ongoing for over 
a decade, but has not yielded any tangible results. Paragraph D, which calls for the implementation of common 
policies in a number of economic sectors, including mining, even though there is little trade among member 
countries in minerals. Paragraph d) is partly at the origin of the 2001 regional mining regulation, which contains 
tax provisions for mining activities (e.g., tax holidays, and minimum free equity participation of the state).  
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partly explains the gaps between the de jure and de facto coordination (Mansour & Rota-
Graziosi, 2013).  
4. Other African economic communities and tax 
coordination 
East African Community 
The East African Community (EAC)22 has a strong legal basis for tax coordination and 
harmonisation. The EAC Treaty Article 80 provides for the harmonisation and the rationalisation 
of investment incentives including relating to taxation of industries. The avoidance of double 
taxation is also explicitly stated. Under the provisions of Article 82, with respect to a monetary 
and financial cooperation, the EAC Treaty calls for fiscal cooperation, harmonised macro-
economic policies within taxation, adjustment of fiscal policies to ensure monetary stability, and 
harmonisation of taxation of capital market transactions. Article 83 mentions that partner states 
shall harmonise their tax policies to remove tax distortions. Also the Common Market Protocol is 
explicit on tax harmonisation. Article 32 is derived from Article 83 of the Treaty by mentioning that 
progressively harmonise tax policies, laws and administration are needed to remove distortions 
in order to facilitate free movement of goods, trade taxes and consumption taxes such VAT and 
Excise Duties.23 
The scope of the tax harmonisation and co-operation is not restricted to indirect taxation. This 
broader approach allows a more extensive tax harmonisation and integration between the 
different tax systems which are involved since all fields of taxation seems potentially concerned. 
However, the implementation of tax coordination and harmonisation measures is far away from 
what the treaty and protocol prescribe.  
To remove distortions created by tax differences, the EAC member states adopted the East 
African Community Customs and Management Act (EACCMA) in 2005. The Act provides for 
uniform application of customs treatment of movement of goods into and within the community 
with a common external tariff. Under the Customs Union Protocol importation of raw materials, 
capital goods, agricultural inputs and some medical equipment into the EAC attracts zero duty. 
Importers of intermediary goods and other essential industrial inputs pay a tax of 10%, while 
finished products attract 25% duty, as well as a Sensitive Items list with exceptions to the three-
band rule for specified commodities attracting high rates of duty (all above 30%). The 
implementation of EACCMA has been one of the successes of regional integration in the EAC – 
many literature focus on trade liberalisation in EAC. It can be concluded that the result has been 
a coordinated development of customs policy within the region offering certainty to investors as 
well as going a long way in securing the freedom of movement of goods within the EAC. 
However, still different customs procedures are put in place for goods in intracommunity trade, 
                                                   
22 The five EAC member states are Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. 
23 From the IFC and World Bank presentation (September 2013) in Nairobi on the Investment Climate in the East 
African Community. Retrieved from the Tax Compact website:  https://www.taxcompact.net/documents/seminar-
nairobi/Tax-Harmonisation-in-the-EAC_IFC-WBG.pdf  
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resulting that goods are still required to go through the same customs procedures as other goods 
imported from outside the community.  
Recently, it became clear that the EAC member states struggle to agree on how to harmonise 
their domestic taxes, in particular related to VAT. The option for a single VAT rate is off the 
table and instead a gradual review with a focus on adopting a range of VAT rates is now 
mentioned in a draft policy.24 During a meeting of the EAC tax policy and tax 
administration subcommittee held in Nairobi in December 2017, the option of harmonising the 
region’s domestic taxes through a gradual process beginning with excise duty, followed by the 
VAT and finally income tax was put forward for consideration and that the focus needed to be on 
harmonising legislation and not rates. Talks about harmonising domestic taxes were first 
emphasised in May 2012 at the EAC’s Sectoral Council on Finance and Economic Affairs. But 
the EAC countries have made little progress in the harmonisation of domestic taxes, with 
member countries worried about the potential loss of revenues. As it stands, each of the EAC 
member states applies the destination based model of levying VAT. The destination based model 
requires that VAT is levied on goods and services where they are consumed. To avoid 
smuggling, policing of the borders becomes necessary and this adds to the administrative burden 
on each member state and also increases the amount of time that goods from other member 
states take to arrive.25  
In the area of excise, a lack of coordination in the policy governing application and levying of 
excise duty hamper results in member states adopting different ways of levying the tax as well as 
different rates.26 In particular Uganda and Rwanda and Burundi levying the tax at ad valorem 
rate while Kenya and Tanzania opt to apply specific rates in relation to certain goods. The lack of 
coordination means that goods coming in from another member state must be subjected to 
excise duty and therefore subject to long waits at the border points as the goods are verified and 
customs duty imposed.27  
For tax coordination on direct taxation, there has been efforts to reduce harmful tax competition. 
To promote the EAC as a single investment area, the Treaty provides that there should be a 
harmonisation of investment incentives. The members of the EAC have made progress towards 
coordination of their tax incentive regime through the use of a ‘Code of Conduct’. This aims to 
formalise an existing arrangement under which each year the EAC finance ministers meet before 
their budget speeches are made and discuss their budget proposals. This provides the 
opportunity for Finance Ministers to dissuade other members if they propose any new tax 
incentive that puts other countries at a disadvantage (IMF, 2015b). Although there is a shift 
                                                   
24 Retrieved from The East African news website: http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/EAC-talks-
on-single-tax-rate-hit-deadlock/2560-4539122-format-xhtml-pmxhduz/index.html  
25 Paper written by Anapaula Trindade Marinho and Catherine Ngina Mutava, titled: “Tax integration within the 
East African Community: A partial model for regional integration in Africa”. Retrieved from the African 
Development Bank website: https://www.afdb.org/uploads/tx_llafdbpapers/DEF_-_EAC_PAPER_-
_A._Trindade_and_C._Ngina_Mutava.pdf 
26 See also on EAC website: 
https://customs.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&Itemid=172  
27 Paper written by Anapaula Trindade Marinho and Catherine Ngina Mutava, titled: “Tax integration within the 
East African Community: A partial model for regional integration in Africa”. Retrieved from the African 
Development Bank website: https://www.afdb.org/uploads/tx_llafdbpapers/DEF_-_EAC_PAPER_-
_A._Trindade_and_C._Ngina_Mutava.pdf 
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toward tax policy coordination for direct taxation, investment incentives are still offered with 
respect to different industries and there is no harmonisation of corporate income rates.28  
EAC partner countries have moved closer to implementing the Double Taxation Agreement by 
adopting the EAC Tax Treaty Policy and the EAC Model Tax Treaty. The EAC Tax Policy sets 
out the recommended policy positions that should be pursued in tax treaties negotiated 
by EAC with non-EAC countries.29 These policy positions reflect EAC countries’ current 
economic status as developing countries and net importers of capital as well as the need to 
protect their revenue bases without deterring foreign investment. The EAC ministers during their 
meeting in December 2017 proposed that partner states should use the UN tax convention as 
the starting point with the aim of guiding countries in designing double taxation treaties, as well 
as in applying and interpreting them. The EAC tax policy identifies the international tax norms 
that the EAC should follow with respect to scope, distributive rules, elimination of double taxation, 
non-discrimination, mutual agreement procedures, and exchange of information. In terms of the 
scope, the policy suggests that EAC treaties should only cover income taxes as none 
of EAC partner states imposes taxes on capital. The policy makes specific proposals on 
distribution rules, including income from immovable property, business profits, international 
transport, dividends, interests and royalties, income from service, capital gains and directors’ fee, 
entertainers. The tax treaty on the other hand seeks to eliminate double taxation among the 
states by imposing an obligation on the resident state to give credit for the source 
state tax against the resident state tax on income or exempt the income from tax. 
SADC 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC)30 aims to reduce and ultimately to 
eliminate tax competition that damages the region’s revenue mobilisation efforts. The SADC 
Protocol on Finance and Investment provides for cooperation and coordination on tax incentives 
in the region. The “Guidelines for the application and treatment of tax incentives in the SADC 
region” and the “Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in Taxation and Related 
Matters” seek endeavours by the Member States to avoid harmful tax competition or introducing 
tax legislation that prejudices another Member State’s economic policies or activities (IMF, 
2015b). 
However, due to the existence of diverse VAT regimes and different tariff structures in the tax 
systems of Member States, as well as the fact that these Member States are also members of 
other trade blocs (e.g. COMESA, SACU and EAC), the process of formulating and harmonising 
fiscal policies in SADC is very complex.31 All the SADC countries (except Angola) have VAT 
                                                   
28 Paper written by Anapaula Trindade Marinho and Catherine Ngina Mutava, titled: “Tax integration within the 
East African Community: A partial model for regional integration in Africa”. Retrieved from the African 
Development Bank website: https://www.afdb.org/uploads/tx_llafdbpapers/DEF_-_EAC_PAPER_-
_A._Trindade_and_C._Ngina_Mutava.pdf   
29 Retrieved from The East African news website: http://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/EAC-countries-to-
harmonise-tax-regimes---/2560-4221812-format-xhtml-eauu3nz/index.html  
30 Member states are: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
31 Blog post (5 January 2017) of Marcos Miguel, Senior Officer at the Mozambique Revenue Authority. Retrieved 
from the website of the International Tax and Investment Centre: https://iticnet.blog/2017/01/05/the-basis-for-the-
harmonization-of-vat-and-excise-taxes-in-sadc/  
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systems, all except the Seychelles have payroll taxes and all have corporate taxes on profits. 
However, the definitions of the tax bases are extremely heterogeneous. Enhanced there is more 
cooperation in tax matters than tax coordination in the SADC in the form of mutual and 
multilateral assistance in tax matters, tax treaties and double tax agreements (Deloitte, 2015). 
This fits in the overall struggle of SADC to fully become a common market as it still struggles with 
implementations of the Customs Union.32 
The SADC VAT and Excises guidelines were published in November 2016 by the SADC VAT 
and Excise Committee, after being approved by SADC Finance Ministers. These guidelines 
cover the design, administration and exchange of information, as well as mutual assistance in the 
field of VAT and Excise. Studies have found that the existence of differences in rates of VAT and 
Excise has been a key cause of the smuggling of beverages and cigarettes from countries with 
low tax rates to countries where rates are higher. The general objective of these guidelines is to 
establish an overview of the region’s fiscal policy, including:33  
• Harmonisation of VAT and Excise rates across SADC countries;  
• Harmonisation of administrative aspects, including definitions, incidence, exemptions, 
coordination, labelling, and quality standards, and;  
• A ban on production of goods for export to another Member State that do not comply with 
the standards required in that Member State. 
The detailed guidelines make effective the provisions of the SADC Finance and Investment 
Protocol with respect to the harmonisation of indirect taxes and will gradually replace 
international trade revenues on trade in goods and services by extending the tax base of indirect 
taxes. It will also promote the adoption of ad valorem taxes on goods and services subject to 
excise taxation with alternative to the application of multiple rates of VAT. Furthermore, it creates 
conditions for SADC member countries to sign bilateral agreements with each other, based on 
the SADC Model Tax Agreements, in order to agree on the exchange of information on VAT and 
excise, sales and provision of mutual assistance on the collection of revenues. However, 
although various reports showed the importance of tax coordination.34 Letete (2012) highlighted 
that the harmonisation process is vital in so far as it aims at ensuring that equal conditions for 
competitors are not distorted by discriminatory tax systems and would also mitigate the demerits 
                                                   
32 Retrieved from the SADC website: http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/common-market/  
33 Blog post (5 January 2017) of Marcos Miguel, Senior Officer at the Mozambique Revenue Authority. Retrieved 
from the website of the International Tax and Investment Centre: https://iticnet.blog/2017/01/05/the-basis-for-the-
harmonization-of-vat-and-excise-taxes-in-sadc/ 
34 The analysis of Ade et al. (2017) shows some important policy implications for the SADC (given its 
heterogeneous nature), aimed at enhancing the process of regional tax harmonisation. First, there is a need for 
the SADC to develop policies aimed at collectively expanding corporate tax base in order to accommodate the 
relatively low optimum CIT rates, particularly because the adoption of lower optimum CIT rates may lead to a 
reduction in tax revenue. Second, the adoption of an optimum VAT rate by all SADC member countries will 
reduce the usage of different politically motivated VAT rates by individual member states as instruments to gain 
voters’ confidence. Third, the overlapping membership of regional groupings of the SADC countries could stifle 
further tax harmonisation initiatives in the SADC, warranting relevant policy intervention. Fourth, given that there 
is already a protocol on taxation in the SADC, some further policy considerations towards enhanced 
harmonisation and tax revenue could include developing a benchmarking process with other regional economic 
groupings. These include economic groupings in pursuit of tax harmonisation such as the EU and the EAC. 
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of tax competition in the SADC - it is the implementation of the guidelines and the protocol that is 
lacking behind.  
There is no significant progress on tax coordination on direct taxation and investment incentives. 
COMESA 
The member states of the largest regional economic community in Africa, the Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA),35 are very heterogeneous. Tax coordination is only 
a matter for trade duties (it has a common external tariff that is equal to the EAC), without explicit 
directives or other legislatives for tax coordination and harmonisation for other revenue sources. 
In its 2016 and 2017 Key Issues in Regional Integration reports, the COMESA emphasised the 
importance of revenue mobilisation and to tackle harmful tax competition, however, it does not 
push the topic further like in the ECOWAS and EAC.    
One development that the International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation report (IBFD, 2013, 
p.18) mentioned regarding COMESA is that COMESA Court of Justice made an important 
decision in the case of Polytol Paints & Adhesives Manufacturers Co. Ltd v. the Republic of 
Mauritius (Case Reference Number 1 of 2012) which was delivered on 31 August 2013. It 
concluded that the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Mauritius could not justify the breach 
of Article 46 of the COMESA Treaty. Until then, infringements to and non-implementation of the 
COMESA Treaty, Protocols and Secondary Regulations went un-penalised, rendering these 
instruments ineffective.36  
Other African economic communities 
There is very little literature on the progress of tax coordination and harmonisation in other 
regional economic communities in Africa. The lack of literature on tax coordination combined with 
some information on the instalment of integration processes in regional economic communities, it 
can be concluded that there is no significant developments to be reported on the topic, for 
                                                   
35 Member countries are: Burundi, Comoros, D.R. Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 
36 The dispute arose over a 40% customs duty imposed in Mauritius on specific products imported by the 
company from Egypt, one year after the elimination of customs duties on products originating from another 
COMESA member state. Both Egypt and Mauritius are member states of COMESA. The applicant, a company 
incorporated in Mauritius, first appealed to the Supreme Court of Mauritius. The Court rejected the company’s 
claim for a refund of the duty based on the reasoning that the provisions of the COMESA Treaty could only be 
applied in Mauritius if they had been domesticated. Since Mauritius did not follow the COMESA legal notice 
instructing member states to issue legal or statutory instruments to put into effect the requirements of article 46 of 
the COMESA Treaty, the Court reasoned it had no legal basis to accept the application. Dissatisfied with the 
decision of the Supreme Court, the company brought the case before the CCJ, which ruled: X that COMESA 
citizens have no right to refer to the Court issues relating to non-fulfilment of Treaty obligations by a member 
state as this is a prerogative of other member states and the Secretary General of COMESA. However, COMESA 
citizens may appeal against the enactment of laws which breach the COMESA Treaty; X that imposing customs 
duty was an infringement to the Treaty. The CCJ reasoned that article 46 of the Treaty required member states to 
eliminate duties on goods from other member states (by the year 2000), and that once Mauritius joined the Free 
Trade Area (FTA) in November 2000, it could not selectively apply article 46 and impose duties on products from 
some member states in the FTA; and X that a bilateral agreement concluded between two member states, such 
as Mauritius and Egypt, which includes a provision that derogates from the obligation of eliminating customs 
duties is incompatible with the object and purpose of the FTA (IBFD, 2013, p). 
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example in the African Maghreb Union (AMU), the Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS), and the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). 
5. How Africa compares with other regions? 
A quick comparison between the African trade blocs and their counterparts outside the continent, 
shows that the efforts of African regional economic communities are not behind, or in case of the 
WAEMU and EAC some kind of frontrunners, compared to that of others, like ASEAN 
(Banderlipe, 2015; Jogarajan, 2013),37 MERCOSUR or Andean Community.  
In Central America, coordination of tax incentives has some history (IMF, 2015b, p.31). Between 
1962 and 1984, four countries (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua) were parties 
to a convention on tax incentives, which mandated uniform tax incentives and prohibited the 
introduction of new ones. In 2012, the Committee of Ministers of Finance of Central America, 
Panama, and the Dominican Republic (COSEFIN) discussed the adoption of a “Declaration of 
Good Practices” for investment tax incentives, which was preceded by a wide-ranging exercise to 
quantify the cost of existing tax incentives to make a stronger case for their removal. Discussions 
on a mandatory code of good practices remain ongoing (IMF, 2015b, p.31). 
Overall, there is a lack of literature that makes good comparisons of tax coordination and tax 
harmonisation between different regional economic communities.  
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